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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The issue of audit tenure has been discussed since four decades age. Nowadays, due to the 
recent corporate scandals in the United States, the issue is discussed together with auditor 
independence that led to companies’ demise. Mandatory audit rotation debates come from 
the arguments that long audit tenure would create cosy relationship between auditors and 
clients and thus would lead to audit reporting failure such as in the case of bankruptcy. 
Therefore, this study attempts to investigate the situation in Malaysia whereby no empirical 
study using archival data has been done Specifically, the current study examines the impact 
of audit tenure on the issuance of going concern opinion. The result shows that audit firm 
tenure is positively significant in determining going concern opinion. Our findings also 
pointed that if a client never changed its auditor since listing, there is a tendency to issue a 
clean opinion though the client suffers apparent financial problems. Therefore, it can be said 
that, “auditor change would do well, but forcing an unrealistic auditor rotation might not 
yield what it hopes for”. For the benefit of auditing profession, we echo the importance of 
self-regulation and Laissez-faire practice in Malaysia as a better alternative than a mandatory 
auditor rotation. Further sensitivity analyses show that the results are robust to different 
measurements. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Audit Firm Tenure, Audit Firm Switching, Auditor Reporting 
Quality, Going Concern Opinion, Mandatory Auditor Rotation 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of auditor tenure on the issuance of 
going concern opinion in public listed companies (PLCs) on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange. In addition, we examine the independence of audit committee and 
Big Five firms on the issuance of going concern opinion in the light of the new 
International Standard of Auditing 570 Going Concern (ISA 570). Prior to 1998, the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) did not adopt the IAG 23 on assessment of 
going concern assumption. Later, in 1998, the MIA adopted ISA 570 Going Concern 
by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), which was then revised in 
year 2000 and became operative from January 2002. Among significant changes 
between IAG 23 and ISA 570 include provision to assess going concern assumption 
in every audit engagement and additional prescription to guide practitioners in 
detecting going concern problem.  
 
Since the auditor is an agent to the shareholders in monitoring managers’ duties to 
create wealth for the principals (shareholders), auditor’s failure to inform 
shareholders on the going concern of the principal’s business is a serious matter. 
With the introduction of the US Sarbanes Oxley, auditor’s relationship with client is 
now being regulated to at least of the engagement audit partner’s tenure. The length 
of tenure of an audit firm maintains a client has long been an issue in the United 
States and other countries (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Shockley, 1981; Arrunada and 
Paz-Ares, 1997; and Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). Such long-term relationships 
could, in reality or be perceived to make the audit firms too committed or beholden 
to the companies, thereby undermining its independence, compromising its 
objectivity, and reducing its effectiveness (The Star, 2002). Several countries in 
European Union such as Italy and Spain have required the audit firms to rotate by a 
certain time (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). However, even in such a mandatory 
audit rotation regime, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that audit quality is 
improved by this means. As evidence, the latest scandal involves a company namely 
Parmalat in Italy complied with a law that requires companies to change their 
auditors every nine years. The discovery of losses amounting to RM41.8 billion in 
Parmalat has provoked outrage across continent of Europe and proves that the law of 
auditor rotation still does not help to improve audit quality (The News Straits Times, 
Dec. 27, 2003).  
 
In the past few years, auditors had been blamed due to the role of themselves in the 
mega corporate scandals such as Enron Incorporation, WorldCom Incorporation, 
Global Crossing, ImClone Systems Incorporation and Tyco International. Such 
criticism had raised lots of questions regarding auditors’ independence. Besides, 
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such criticism was levelled against auditors because they audit their clients for a long 
time and subsequently concentrated more on non-audit services rather than audit. For 
example in the case of Enron, Andersen was the auditor since Enron was set up until 
collapsed. For that reason, there has been a call for sweeping changes in the auditing 
profession to ensure independence and therefore improve their audit quality (The 
Star, Aug, 12, 2002).  
 
It is often argued that mandatory audit rotation is one of the solutions to solve 
auditor’s cosy relationship with their clients. Auditor rotation supporters argue that 
its benefits stem from greater audit independence, which in turn improves audit 
quality. However, the cost of imposing mandatory audit rotation would lead to 
higher start-up cost, impedes learning curve as well as the failures to attract new-
blood to the accounting profession and lower investment from the audit firms to 
enhance knowledge and expertise in certain industries (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). In 
the case of Malaysia where foreign direct investment is still a major economic 
contributor, the country looks less attractive than its neighboring counterparts (where 
there is no mandatory rotation except for Singapore which mandate audit partner 
rotation for PLC) since the appointment of auditors is usually of company affairs and 
not of regulators as stated under Section 9 (6) the Malaysian Companies Act 1965.  
 
In ASEAN, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has requisitioned all banks 
incorporated in Singapore to change their audit firms every five years under a new 
ruling. The new audit requirement is one of a series of control measures on corporate 
governance introduced by the Singapore authorities (The Star, March, 14, 2002). 
According to Ravi Menon, executive director of the authority’s supervisory policy 
and banking departments, the mandatory audit firm rotation would help prevent audit 
firms from having excessive focus on maintaining long-term commercial 
relationships with the banks they audit. However, in Malaysia there is no regulation 
binding the banks or the companies to change the audit firms within a certain period.  
 
 
2.0 THE MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY  
 
The most important motivation to carry out this study is lack of consensus among the 
public, regulators and audit firms on the issue of mandatory audit firm rotation. Teoh 
and Lim (1996) found that in Malaysia, the public perceived auditor rotation would 
improve auditor independence. However, recently, Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA) suggested a more lenient way to regulate auditor independence. 
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This calls for a mandatory rotation of the audit partners responsible for the audit of 
listed companies after a period of not more than seven years. Furthermore, the audit 
partner rotating after such period should not resume the role of audit engagement 
partner for the audit client until two years have elapsed. Prior to this pronouncement, 
in 1999, the MIA under its former president, Datuk Hanifah Noordin, called for a 
mandatory rotation of external auditors in every three or five years (The New Straits 
Times, March 26, 1999).  
 
Following the corporate scandals in the United States, the regulators in Malaysia 
such as the Malaysia Securities Commission (SC) and the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) became more concerned with the mandatory rotation of the audit 
firms. In view of the importance of the issue in question, the MIA and the Malaysia 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), which are the accounting bodies 
in Malaysia, agreed to establish an MIA/MICPA joint Taskforce on Auditor 
Independence in May 2002. Both institutes agreed that the overall disadvantages of 
mandatory rotation of audit firms, including exorbitant costs, disruption and loss of 
accumulative knowledge, and a restriction on the freedom of companies to choose 
their own auditors, outweigh the benefits that may be derived from such rotation of 
audit firms (the Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 2002). Therefore this study tries 
to prove that whether these suggestions can be use in the current situation in 
Malaysia. The regulators must emphasize the impact of auditor tenure to the audit 
reporting quality especially if there is a negative relationship between auditor tenure 
and audit reporting quality. If this situation occurs, it can be said that long time 
auditors are deemed to impair their independence when auditing their clients.  
 
In addition, no empirical studies have been carried out in Malaysia regarding auditor 
tenure and audit reporting quality. This study examines the local setting namely 
Malaysian companies listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (Main Board and 
Second Board). Hopefully, this study will give new understanding on the auditing 
profession in Malaysia. The results from this study will be useful for the regulators in 
improving the independence of the auditor. Finally, the results can be used by the 
companies to improve both the effectiveness and efficiency of the audit that they 
undertake besides their relationship with the auditors in gaining the public trust.  
 
Auditor quality has been the focus of concern in recent times due to several mega 
corporate scandals in the United States and the latest in Europe. For that reason our 
study contributes to the body of knowledge on current situations of audit quality by 
examining the financially distressed companies in Malaysia and by introducing a 
289 
 
new variable which is the auditor change variable. This study would then serves as a 
feedback to the regulators regarding the mandatory rotation and the auditors’ 
independence in Malaysia. 
 
 
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
This section highlights several studies that utilized auditor tenure as a variable and its 
effect to the audit quality. Deis and Giroux (1992) found that the audit quality 
decreases as auditor tenure increase. The reason they gave was that the auditors 
become less challenge and therefore less likely to use innovative audit procedures 
and finally fail to maintain their competency.  
 
Similarly, Stice (1991) found that the relationship between auditor tenure and a 
lawsuit against the auditor. In the study, he found that auditor tenure was shorter for 
those audit engagements that resulted in a lawsuit against the auditor in the case of 
control sample that matched only on time period. However, the same is not true 
when compared to an industry pair-matched control sample.  
 
De Angelo (1981b) also mentioned that the quality of auditors divided to two parts. 
First is to detect anything misleading in financial statements of the client and 
secondly is to report the misleading. The first quality is regarding the competence 
and skills of the auditors to detect any fraud while the second one is regarding the 
auditors’ independence. In the case of long time auditor, it is argued that the 
auditor’s independence will be reduced due to the fact that the auditor feels 
comfortable with the clients whether in term of revenue and also their expertise on 
the clients’ system. Subsequently they will not report any misleading information to 
ensure there is no any change of auditors. In that case, an unqualified report (clean 
report) will be issued.  
 
In the point of view of regulators, long association between a corporation and an 
accounting firm may lead to impairing their independence (Geiger and 
Raghunandan, 2002). The United States regulators emphasized on this since 1976 
under the Metcalf Committee report (the U.S. Senate, 1976) which suggested that 
mandatory auditor rotation as a way for the accounting profession to bolster their 
independence from clients. However, this was only a suggestion. Perhaps the current 
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act, which has been enacted in the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) will 
remedy this. Under this act, auditor independence is regulated through audit partner 
rotation but not for the case of audit firm as the whole. The lead audit or coordinating 
partner and the reviewing partner must rotate off of the audit every 5 years. 
However, in Malaysia, the MIA suggested 7 years to rotate the lead audit partner. 
 
The studies of on auditor tenure could not separate from the auditor switching 
studies. Many studies found that financially distressed firms were more likely to 
switch auditors than non stressed companies due to the reason that these types of 
companies need to hire a new quality of auditor compared to the previous one 
(Krishnan, 1994; and Krishnan and Stephens, 1995). Sinason et al. (2001) found that 
auditor tenure is longer for clients who received unqualified or unqualified-modified 
opinions. Interestingly, Hashanah (1998) found in Malaysia such behaviour is less 
apparent using data from 1975-1995. In one extreme case, the auditor was not even 
replaced after issuing five consecutive times of a disclaimer opinion to a client. But, 
the results statistically equivalent, meaning that no evidence exists to indicate that 
auditor tenure is longer for clients with unqualified opinions.  
 
Figure 1 shows relevant studies that have used the audit tenure variable in relation to 
auditors’ reporting. It seems that audit tenure variable in empirical study is still new 
though debates on audit tenure have gone through times and tides for four decades. 
Results are inconclusive like many other researches in auditing and thus prompting 
for a need of a new study in a new environment especially in new emerging markets 
like Malaysia. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Studies on Audit Tenure to Auditor Reporting 
 
Studies Measurement of 
audit tenure 
Country Sample Audit tenure 
to auditor 
reporting 
Geiger & 
Raghunandan (2002)  
Natural log of 
number of years  
U.S. 117 stressed &  
bankrupt companies  
Positive 
Anandarajan, La  
Salle & Anandarajan  
(2001) 
Dichotomous  
value, 1 for audit 
tenure of three  
years or less & 0  
otherwise 
U.S.  
 
Two partition of 216  
for financial service  
& 307 from non- 
financial service  
industry 
Negative 
Vanstraelen (2000) Number of years Belgium 146 match sample of  
stressed & non- 
stressed non- 
bankrupt companies 
Negative 
Louwers (1998) Number of years U.S.  
 
808 stressed non- 
bankrupt companies 
Not 
significant  
 
Similarly, Krishnan (1994); and Krishnan and Stephens (1995) found that switching 
companies were no more likely to have their modified report removed than were 
similar companies that did not switch auditors. Therefore, it is argued that if the 
financially distressed firms still maintain the same auditors and by the same time, if 
an unqualified report is issued, it may be perceived that the auditors’ independence is 
impaired. In addition, studies by Teoh and Lim (1996) found that retention of 
auditors for over five years would influence and impair audit independence.  
 
It is argued that the longer the auditors audit their clients the larger that lead to such 
close relationship between audit firms and clients and thus would inhibits auditors 
power in audit conflicts i.e. going concern issues. Studies by Deis & Giroux (1992), 
O’Keefe et al. (1994) and Raghunandan et al. (1994) found that longer auditor tenure 
would decrease audit quality. Vanstraelen (2000) studies the effect of auditor tenure 
to auditor giving clean opinion and found negative effect of this relationship and thus 
provide supports for mandatory rotation. In addition, Anandarajan, La Salle and 
Anandarajan (2001) found evidence that short auditor tenure increase the likelihood 
of receiving a disclaimer going concern opinion. Longer tenure auditors are likely to 
only modify the opinion of an audit report when the issue of going concern is at 
stakes which is less conservative. In an experimental setting, Dopuch, King, & 
Schwartz (2001) found that auditors are less likely to impose a biased report if 
rotation is required, however, it also increases the magnitude of investment to 
improve financial reporting quality.  
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In contrast, Petty & Cuganesan (1996) argued that when mandatory auditor rotation 
is regulated, clients might be forced to accept a lower quality of service from an 
auditor who is a generalist, especially if fewer auditors invest in specialized 
industries such as banking, insurance or natural resources. Moreover, studies by 
Louwers (1998); and Johnson et al. (2002) found no evidence of reduced financial 
quality for longer audit firm’s tenures. Recently, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) 
studied a sample of 117 bankrupt companies and suggest that auditors may be more 
influenced by their newly obtained clients in the earlier years of the engagement. 
Thus, audit independence issue or audit competence issue is at stake in early years of 
engagement and not in later years and would result in lesser going concern opinion 
to be issued by short time auditors.  
 
Overall, prior researches suggested that there should not be any hard and fast rules 
on mandatory audit firm rotation. In U.S. many auditors have served their clients for 
more than twenty years (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002) and some since listed in the 
stock exchange. In such cases, auditors would be under greater pressure from clients 
and thus would unlikely issue a going concern opinion. However, auditors may be 
argued to have in-depth knowledge and thus would be able to defend themselves if 
such difficult situation arise and thus would be able to advise their clients if going 
concern assumption is no longer appropriate. Therefore, the derived hypothesis as 
follows (in null form):  
 
H01a: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between audit firm’s 
tenure and the issuance of going concern opinion  
 
H01b: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between companies, 
which never change their auditors since listed in Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE), and the issuance of going concern opinion  
 
 
4.0 RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION  
 
Sample and Data  
The sample comprises all non-finance distressed companies identified using a list of 
financial indicators under ISA 570 (revised) Going Concern. The year of 2002 is 
selected since the ISA 570 (revised) is applicable from 1 January 2002. We found 
187 companies, which fulfilled the distress characteristics.  
293 
 
Explanations of the Model  
This study replicates the model from the previous established studies in going 
concern audit opinion (see for example, Louwers, 1998; and Geiger and 
Raghunandan, 2002).  
 
The research model (in logistic form) is as follows:  
GC = a + b1TENURE + b2AUDITSWITCH + b3BIGFIVE + b4ACOMOUT + 
b5ZFC + b6DEFAULT + b7LOGASSETS + e  
 
The measurements of the variables are as follows:  
 
Dependent Variable Measurement  
GC   = 1 if auditor issued going-concern opinion, else 0  
 
Hypotheses Variables  
TENURE  = Audit firm tenure in number of years  
AUDITSWITCH = Dummy variable, 1 if client never change its auditor at  
            least once since listed in the KLSE, 0 otherwise  
 
Control Variables Measurement  
BIGFIVE = Dummy variable, 1 if the auditor is the Big Five firm, 
            and else 0  
ACOMOUT = Dummy variable, 1 if the audit committee is comprised 
            of all non-executive directors, else 0  
ZFC = Probability of bankruptcy calculated from Zmijewski 
            Financial Condition (1984)  
DEFAULT = Dummy variable having a value of 1 if the company is  
            in default, else 0  
LOGASSETS  = Natural log of total assets of clients  
e    = Error term of residual  
a i    = constant (i = 0)  
b   = coefficients (i =1,2,3,4,5,6,7)  
 
Tenure & Audit Switch  
Tenure is the hypothesis variable measured by the length of audit firm tenure in 
years since the KLSE was established. Audit firm tenure is measured by the length of 
years which audit firms audit their clients (Louwers, 1998 and Vanstraelen, 2000). In 
the sensitivity analyses, we use logarithmic transformation to correct for non-
normality in the distribution of the data (see Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). 
Similarly, we argue that auditors are in greater pressures from clients especially if 
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the auditors have served the clients since listed in the stock exchange for many years. 
Due to the mixed theories and empirical findings, we do not provide direction for 
this relationship.  
 
Big Five  
DeAngelo (1981b) theorized that bigger audit firms have superior audit quality since 
they invest more in audit technology and training. Thus, in term of audit competence, 
it could be argued that larger audit firm would be able to detect problems regarding 
going-concern assumption more accurately than smaller audit firms. In term of audit 
independence, larger audit firms have more spreads of clients base when auditing 
listed companies than smaller audit firms (See Atef & Ayoib, 2000) and thus have 
less dependence on particular client. In addition, Palmrose (1988) found that the 
larger audit firms were less likely to be involved in audit-related litigation than the 
smaller one. Alternatively, Big Five firms have greater risk of losing reputation, 
which may motivate a more objective audit reporting decision. Anandarajan et al. 
(2001) however, found no evidence of auditor size effect on auditor going concern 
reporting. Such finding warrant a further study, perhaps in Malaysia, since the public 
perceive differences exist in many aspects of auditing between bigger firms and 
smaller firms including going concern assumption and not tested in Atef et al. 
(2002).  
 
Audit Committees  
Audit committee has been made mandatory in Malaysia since 19931. It is more likely 
that interaction between audit committee with external auditors may influence 
auditor’s choice of issuing going-concern2. An independent audit committee could 
help mitigate such pressure by supporting the auditor in disputes with management 
(Knapp, 1987). Hence, we expect some characteristics of board of directors, 
especially non-executive directors, as public watchdog and audit committee will 
influence auditor’s choice in going-concern. Knapp (1987) found that in audit 
disputes, audit committee members tended to support the auditors rather than the 
management. However, several other researches have provided the support for 
having more outside directors on audit committee (e.g Cadbury Report, 1992; 
Carcello & Neal, 2000). Atef et al. (2000) found evidence that independent audit 
committee is associated with going concern opinion using the year 2000 data from 
the KLSE. 
1 Beginning 31 August 1993, companies seeking listing on KLSE are required to have audit 
committee under s15A of KLSE listing requirement.  
 
2 Among main functions of audit committee are reviewing audit planning and audit procedures and 
discussing audit findings and report (MIA recommended practice guide on Audit Committee & 
section 344A KLSE listing requirements).  
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We argue that placing strategic executive directors on the committee may shadow a 
measurement of independence of audit committee by proportion of outside directors. 
We believe that a higher independence of audit committee, which is measured by 
non-existence of powerful directors especially the managing director and executive 
directors (see also Carcello & Neal, 2000) would lend better support for auditors. 
Thus, independent audit committees will ensure that the audit opinion really gives a 
picture the situation of that company.  
 
Probability of Bankruptcy  
Several studies found that a positively relationship between going concern opinion 
and probability of bankruptcy of a company. This is due to the fact that, the higher 
probability of bankruptcy, the higher the need of the auditors to issue going-concern 
opinion. Regardless of whatever bankruptcy model being employed in prior 
researches (see among others, Hopwood et al., 1989; Vanstraelen, 2000) in going 
concern opinion, the results suggest that auditors do assess distress condition of their 
clients. Prior research in Malaysia by Atef et al. (2002) used Zmijewski Financial 
Condition (ZFC) as suggested by Zmijewski (1984) and they found significant result. 
Similarly, we employ ZFC to measure financial distress of the companies. Kleinman 
& Anandarajan (2001) suggested that a score, which exceed 0.28 is considered as 
financial distress. Therefore, there is a positive association between probability of 
bankruptcy and going concern audit report.  
 
Default  
In this present study, a company is classified a default company if the company is 
either in payment default or technical default or has breached loan covenants. 
Therefore, we employ dichotomous variable as suggested by Chen & Church (1992). 
Going concern is associated with default status as found in Atef et al. (2002). They 
argued that default status would send strong bad signal that potential and successful 
negotiation with banks or other creditors would be unlikely. In the absence of such 
supports, companies under financial distress would hardly stay as going-concern in 
the future accounting period. Thus, there is a positive association between default 
status and type of going-concern report.  
 
Client Size  
Total assets is used in the present study due to the amount of assets, which are more 
consistent before the 1997 crisis and thereafter compared to those of revenues. 
However, Atef et al. (2002) found no evidence that size of clients measured by total 
assets has association with the type of going concern audit report. Other 
measurements of client size include market capitalization and a mixture of sales and 
assets. It is transformed to logarithmic data to control for non-normality. Consistent 
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with the previous research, a negative relationship between this independent variable 
and going concern opinion is expected (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002).  
 
 
5.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
 
Descriptive Results  
From 187 companies, Arthur Andersen (AA) and Ernst Young (EY) audited 42.17% 
of distressed companies. Since the merger of these two former Big Five firms in July 
2002, almost half of these troubled account or the lion’s share lies with this new EY. 
All Big Five accounts 70.28% of the KLSE troubled firms. This figure is comparable 
with their total shares of the KLSE companies (See Atef and Ayoib, 2000). 77.5% or 
145 on these companies received going concern audit opinion. Thus many problems 
and critics would lie in the case of non-receiving going concern opinion.  
 
T-test in the following Table 1 confirms this preliminary finding that Big Five is 
different than non Big Five in terms of audit opinion and tenure. Big Five generally 
have longer audit tenure and issued a slightly more going concern opinion than non-
Big Five. However, this is only a univariate test-result, which needs to be interpreted 
with caution. To test for our hypothesis, a model that combines multiple variables 
such as regression procedure would unveil whether such relationship holds true in a 
multivariate analysis.  
 
TABLE 1 
 
T-test of B5 and Non-B5 
 
Variables B5 (means) Non B5 
(means) 
t-value Sig. 
TENURE  
(in years)  
10.5 7.26 2.820 0.005* 
GOING  
CONCERN  
0.82 0.70 1.863 0.064* 
ACOMOUT 0.33 0.26 0.910 0.364 
DEFAULT 0.66 0.61 0.657 0.512 
ZFC 15.63 22.99 -0.805 0.422 
AUDITSWITCH 0.44 0.41 0.388 0.698 
TASSETS (RM)  679,922,418 471,684,583 0.767 0.444 
 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) figures are closed to unitary and thus conclude that 
multicollinearity3 poses minimal threat to further regression analysis. In addition, 
3 VIF ranges from 1.0408 to 1.441  
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further inspection using the condition index proves prior VIF test. Correlation matrix 
as in Table 2 between independent variables shows that multicollinearity is minimal. 
The highest is only 0.266 between TENURE and AUDITSWITCH at 0.01 
significant levels. 
 
Table 2 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 GC TENURE AUDITSWITCH BIGFIVE ACOMOUT ZFC DEFAULT TASSETS 
GC 1 .229(**) -.098 .128 .154(*) .171(*) .647(**) .003 
TENURE .229(**) 1 .266(**) .201(**) .122 -.033 .249(**) .085 
AUDITSWITCH -.098 .266(**) 1 -.033 -.031 .034 -.055 -.210(**) 
BIGFIVE .128 .201(**) -.033 1 .039 -.060 .043 .055 
ACOMOUT .154(*) .122 -.031   .039 1 .154(*) .114 .039 
ZFC .171(*) -.033 .034 -.060 .154(*) 1 .199(**) -.101 
DEFAULT .647(**) .249(**) -.055 .043 .114 .199(**) 1 -.055 
TASSETS   .003 .085 -.210(**) .055 .039 -.101 -.055   1 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
 
Going concern opinion has strong and significantly correlation with audit tenure (r = 
0.229), default status (r = 0.647), outside audit committee (r=0.154) and probability 
of bankruptcy (r = 0.171). In contrast, correlation analysis did not find significant 
relationship between Big Five/non Big Five effect on going concern opinion as 
found in t-test. Likewise in prior t-test analysis, univariate results should be read with 
caution and act as a complement to multivariate analysis of logistic regression in this 
study.  
 
Multivariate Regression  
We found similar results as in Geiger & Raghunandan (2002). Logistic regression 
results as in Table 3 shows that audit firm tenure and audit switching variables have 
statistically significant relationship (at-two-tailed) with the occurrence of going 
concern opinion. Hence, H01a and H01b are rejected. This means that the longer an 
audit firm has audited a client the higher is the probability of issuing going concern 
opinion unlike the frequent arguments of negative audit tenure effects made by 
public and business community alike. However, our finding also pointed out that if a 
client never changes its auditors since listed then the possibility of receiving clean 
opinion is higher. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Logistic Regression, n =187 
 
 
Variables Predicte
d Sign 
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
TENURE ? .169 .097 3.012 .083 1.184 
AUDITSWITCH ? -1.094 .660 2.749 .097 .335 
BIGFIVE + .629 .653 .928 .335 1.877 
ACOMOUT + .319 .696 .210 .647 1.375 
ZFC + .606 .203 8.953 .003 1.833 
DEFAULT + 3.367 .820 16.851 .000 28.991 
LOGASSETS   - -.016 .491 .001 .975 .984 
Constant +/- -1.287  4.071 .100 .752 .276 
 
a Variable(s) entered on step 1: TENURE, AUDITSWITCH, BIGFIVE, ACOMOUT, ZFC, 
DEFAULT, LOGASSET.  
 
Cox & Snell R2= 0.464, Nagelkerke R2= 0.714, Hosmer & Lemeshow = 0.947  
 
Moreover, we found no evidence that audit firm size as surrogated by Big Five and 
non-Big Five dichotomous classifications unlike in Behn et al. (2001) and audit 
committee independence have significant influence over auditor reporting decision. 
Mutchler et al. (1997) found similar finding that auditor size has no significant effect 
on going concern decision though they did not provide any explanation. Thus, 
argument of perceived high quality by DeAngelo (1981b) is not apparent as 
generally supported in the case of audit fees research. It is quite possible that a better 
approach is not to use a dichotomous value in audit reporting studies (as a proxy of 
audit quality) unlike in audit fees studies where the perceived difference of audit 
quality can be captured by using dichotomous value of Big Five and non Big Five.  
 
In our sample, 77.55% are companies, which have audit tenure of five years or more. 
We then conducted sensitivity analyses using a dichotomous value of tenure of more 
than three years, more than five years and found those results still holds. Thus, the 
call for mandatory audit rotation may not yield what it hopes for. We would say our 
results do not support auditor rotation and thus change of auditor should be made of 
necessary and reasonable grounds such as in the event of non-performance of 
auditors or change of substantial and controlling shareholders and others.  
 
Using data sets of 2002, the results still support findings of prior study by Atef et al. 
(2002) related to debt-default status and serious financial distress variable. They used 
data in the year 2000. Both variables are strong determinants of auditor’s decision in 
issuing going concern in Malaysia. These findings also contribute to high pseudo R2 
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but it is still comparable with prior researches (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002 had 
pseudo R2 0.33, Louwers, 1998 had pseudo R2 0.44). In addition, assets of the 
companies are proved to be insignificant factor in going concern issues unlike in 
many of audit fees studies. There are several explanations to this finding. Firstly, the 
auditor may investigate the quality of the assets and not just “any assets”. It is quite 
possible, if the distressed company has significant portion of assets, which have 
higher market value and demand such as investment in listed shares or has properties 
of high value would then helps the company to survive much better than others. Thus 
auditor may not issue a going concern opinion to such companies. Secondly, an 
alternative proxy for size in the case of going concern opinion such as revenue or 
turnover of the companies may yield different results.  
 
TABLE 4 
 
Classification Tablea 
 
  Model's predicted opinion 
 
Auditor's Actual Opinion 
 
Standard 
 
Going Concern 
Percentage 
Correct 
 Standard 32 9 78.0 
 Going Concern 12 134 91.8 
Overall Percentage  37.5% 6.7% 88.8  
     
a. The cut value is .500  
 
As in Table 4, model shows minimal change in term of accuracy from Atef et al. 
(2002). The model has high prediction power of 88.8%. Type II (6.7%) is lower than 
type I (37.5%) error, which shows that it is not a serious problem. Type II error leads 
to auditors to give a clean opinion whereby they should give a going concern 
opinion. Thus we can say that most of distressed companies in Malaysia received 
“warning” from their auditor regarding its going concern assumption.  
 
Interestingly, it seems that in Malaysia, auditors are a little bit skeptical or very 
conservative on going concern assumption made by directors and thus they made 
lower type II error and a bit too high type I error. High type I error may lead to self-
fulfilling theory which suggest that their clients may face difficulties in obtaining 
credit or financing facilities from bankers or investors. These factors, the auditors do 
take to the account in their audit opinion when issue going concern opinion. Such 
events would pose higher cost to the auditors i.e. clients switch their auditors but 
Hashanah (1998) found that going concern opinion alone would not precipitate such 
effect. Future research on value relevance of going concern audit opinion may unveil 
this effect.  
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Mandatory audit rotation debates came from the arguments that long audit tenure 
would create costly relationship between auditors and clients and thus would lead to 
audit failure such as in the case of bankruptcy. We found no market wide evidence to 
support that argument in Malaysia but instead we found that longer audit tenure has 
positive significant association with auditor’s reporting decision. In addition, we 
found that auditors in Malaysia made less serious error (type II) or audit failure 
compared to our model i.e give clean opinion for clients who should be given going 
concern opinion when issuing going concern opinion. However, we did not test on 
other type of audit failure such as qualified opinion of non-going concern issues. In 
this study, we did not discriminate the different types of going concern opinion 
including modified opinion, qualified opinion or disclaimer opinion as stated in ISA 
570 (revised 2000).  
 
Our findings also pointed that if a client never changes its auditor since listed, there 
is a tendency to issue a clean opinion though the client suffers apparent financial 
problems. All in all, it simply read, “auditor change would do well, but forcing an 
unrealistic auditor rotation might not yield what it hopes for”. Therefore, for the 
benefit of the auditing profession, we echo the importance of self-regulation and 
Laissez-faire practice in Malaysia as a better alternative than a mandatory auditor 
rotation. Perhaps current national undertakings by regulators such as strengthening 
audit committee in term of independence and competence, and the proposal for a 
peer audit review process by the MIA would inhibit unethical audit process in 
Malaysia.  
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